Turkey's Response to the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective, 1929-1939 by PAMUK, Sevket
WP 
321 
• 02094 
EUR 
Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies 
Turkey's Response to the Great Depression 
in Comparative Perspective, 1929-1939 
~EVKET PAMUK 
RSC No. 2000/21 
Mediterranean Prog ramme Series 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
European University Institute 
\l\\l\\\\\\l\\\l\\\llll\\l\ll\lllll\l\llllllll\lll\llllllll\l\ll 
3 0001 0033 7261 4 
EUI Working Paper RSC No. 2000/21 
Pamuk: Turkey's Response to the Great Depression 
in Comparative Perspective, 1929-1939 
\liP 
321.0209 
4 EUR 
The Rolx:rt Schuman Ci:!ntre was set up by the High Counc il of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disc iplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the fonn of Working Papers. Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
Roben Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/ 
Publil:ationsRSC-Wdcome.htm. In 1999. the Centre merged with the 
European Forum to bl:!come the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies. 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE 
FOR ADVANCED STUDIES 
Turkey's Response to the Great Depression 
in Comparative Perspective, 1929-1939 
$EVKET PAMUK 
Professor. Department of Economics. and 
Director. Atatiirk Institute for Modem Turkish History. 
Bogazi~i University 
EUI Working Paper RSC No. 2000/21 
BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI) 
All rights reserved. 
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author. 
© 2000 ~evket Pamuk 
Printed in Italy in May 2000 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I- 50016 San Domenico (FI) 
Italy 
Mediterranean Programme 
The Mediterranean Prograrrune was established at the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Autumn 1998. The 
Mediterranean Prograrrune has two long-term strategic objectives. First, to 
provide education and conduct research which combines in-depth knowledge of 
the Middle East and North Africa, of Europe, and of the relationship between 
the Middle East and North Africa and Europe. Second, to promote awareness of 
the fact that the developments of the Mediterranean area and Europe are 
inseparable. The Mediterranean Prograrrune will provide post-doctoral and 
doctoral education and conduct high-level innovative scientific research. 
The Mediterranean Programme has received generous financial support 
for Socio-Political Studies from three major institutions who have 
guaranteed their support for four years: ENI S.p.A, Ente Cassa di 
Risparmio di Firenze, and Mediocredito Centrale . The European 
Investment Bank, Compagnia di San Paolo and Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena have offered generous financial support for four years for studies 
in Political Economy which will be launched in Spring 2000. In 
addition, a number of grants and fellowships for nationals of the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries have been made available 
by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for doctoral students) and the 
City of Florence (Giorgio La Pira Fellowship for post-doctoral fellows). 
For further information: 
Mediterranean Programme 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
European University Institute 
via dei Roccettini. 9 
500 16 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
Fax: + 39 055 4685 770 
http://www. iue. it/RSC/MED/ 
1- Introduction 
Many developing countries around the world experienced a turning point 
during the 1930s. The contrast between before and after 1929 ' may often 
be exaggerated, but there is little doubt that in many parts of the 
developing world the decade witnessed a closing towards international 
trade and capital flow s and a relative rise in import-substituting act ivities. 
The crisis also changed the nature of political power with a weakening of 
the large landowners and export oriented interests and the commitment to 
the liberal order that prevailed until World War I. In many countries 
control fell into more populi st hands. with nationalist leanings towards 
autarchy and import substituting industrialization. 
During the 1980s Carlos Diaz Alejandro and Angus Maddison 
showed that , whatever the outcomes may be in the longer term, developing 
economies that shifted to protectio nism and inward-looking po licies 
generally fared better during the Great Depression than those that adhered 
to the earlier strategy based o n primary exports. 1 Diaz A lejandro also 
offered a list of policy instruments adopted by the interventionist 
governments in Lat in America during the 1930s. These were, in order of 
decreas ing importance, exchange rate policies, import repression and 
import di version . expansionary monetary and fiscal policies and a variety 
of other measures ranging from wage repress ion and public works 
programs to debt repudiation. These should not be viewed as a 
comprehen sive set of measures, however. In the absence of a unified body 
of theory, they were mostl y ad hoc measures adopted by the diffe rent 
governments in response to the specific conditions in each country.2 The 
shift towards an interventionist, inward oriented regime was not complete 
in the 1930s, but emerged fully after World War 11 when the export 
pess imism of Raoul Prebisch and the ECLA arguments of structuralist and 
interventionist development provided the necessary theoretical support. 3 
Not a ll regions or countries experie nced these trends to the same 
degree, however. For one thing, shocks, policies and capacities differed 
substan tiall y from country to country. On the whole, colonies of European 
powers adhered more closely to the orthodox regimes. Similarly, countries 
where the landed interests were more powerful or where they could not be 
challenged tended to remain more passive and adhere to the earlie r model. 
1 Diaz A leja ndro (1 984 ) and Maddison ( 1985) . 
: D iaz A leja ndro (1984 ). pp . 17-39. Compare wi t h Bu lmer Thomas (1994), pp. 
~0 1-J 7. 
-' Tayloql998). pp. 3-7. 
On the ot her hand, ability and willingness to act ively manipulate policy 
instruments such as exchange rates , tariffs and domestic credit were 
greatest in countries which were either large or had re lati ve ly autonomous 
public secto rs. 
In regional terms, Latin America tended to move more towards the 
new, in ward looking strategy, whil e the experience of developi ng countries 
in Asia was more heterogeneous. Around the Mediterranean the outcomes 
were also diverse . In compari son to the expans ionary countries in Latin 
America, southern Europea n countries tended to remain fi scally 
conservat ive while embrac ing protectionism and stronger bi lateral relations 
with Germany. In Fasc ist Italy the government moved slowly towards a 
controlled eco nomy. An ort hodox policy of tight mo ney was accompan ied 
by tariff measures to protect those domestic indu stries that stood to lose the 
most from an overvalued currency. Coercive measures typical of 
consolidated dicta torship were taken both to reduce wages and control 
prices. Recovery from the depression was therefore s low until the orthodox 
policies were reversed in 1935 by the decis io n to conquer Abyssinia.~ In 
Greece macroeconomic policy was more expansionary. In addition to 
providing early support to tobacco and wheat producers, the government 
moved away from the gold standard in 1932, the first country in the 
Balkans to do so. and adopted exchange controls the following year. With 
protection ism and other forms of government support for import 
substituting activities. the indu strial sector in Greece registered during the 
1930s one of the highest rates of expansion anywhere in Europe 5 
In the eastern and southern Mediterranean, on the other hand, 
colonial admi nistrations in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and the countries of 
the Maghrib (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) did relatively little in 
response to the depression. Writers on the Brtish and Fre nch empires a 
number of major principles underlying colonial economic practice all of 
which were in evidence in the management of these countries. Most 
importantl y. colonies were expected to pay for themselves witho ut recourse 
to special financia l assistance from the metropolis. T hi s produced pressures 
for fisca l conservatism including the need to balance the budgets. 
Secondl y. the colonial currencies were tied closely to that of the metropolis 
to fac ilitate trade and payments flows. Typically, a colonial currency was 
managed by a currency board in London or Paris. 6 
• Fc111slcin. Tcmin and Toniolo ( 1997). pp. 175-77. 
s Lam pc am.! Ja.:kson ( 1982). pp. -B-l-519. 
" O"cn anJ P;imuk ( 1998). pp. 51-53. 
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In Egypt, in addition to British pressure, large landowners enjoyed 
often decisive influence over the nominally independent government. The 
landowners exercised control through their association with the various 
parties as well as their strong presence in the parliament. Under the 
circumstances, the emerging manufacturing interests could hope to obtain 
government support only to the extent a llowed by the landed groups. 
Hence, support for the domestic texti les industry was the logical choice. 
The extent of protectionism for this and other branches of industry 
remained 
7 
limited in relation to other, more interventionist countries, 
however. 
This paper will re-examine the economic policies and the 
performance of the Turkish economy during the Great Depression from the 
comparative perspective offered by Diaz Alejandro and Maddison. The 
Great Depression was sharply felt especially in the foreign trade oriented 
regions of the country. In response, the policies of the government 
controlled by an urban based bureaucracy were strong ly interventionist. 
Protectionist measures of the early years were followed in 1932 by the 
adoption o f etatism or import s ubstituting indu strialization led by the state. 
The recovery of the 1930s was st ronger in Turkey than anywhere else 
around the eastern Mediterranean. 
The legacy of the 1930s profoundly influenced attitudes toward 
international trade in Turkey. Per capital foreign trade indicators reached in 
the 1920s were nor surpassed until the 1960s. Similarly, the degree of 
openness of the 1920s as measured by the exports/GDP ratio was not 
exceeded until the 1980s. Unfortunately, because of the absence of long 
term macroeconomic series until recently, it has not been possible to study 
analytically and quantitatively the 1930s and more generally the first half 
of this century. Partly because of this deficiency, debates about the 1930s 
have focu sed overwhelmingly on etatism or state-led industrialization as a 
mode l for the post-World War 11 era. 
The paper will also examine the reasons for the re latively strong 
performance of Turkey's economy during 1929-1939. Turkey belongs to 
the camp of interventionist regimes during the 1930s. The commonly 
accepted explanation has long emphasized that etatism or state led 
industriali zation was responsible for the strong performance of the urban 
secto r. While e tatism signi fican tly contributed to the country's 
industrializat ion after World War Jl, it is difficult to accept that argument 
7 Owcn and Pamuk ( 1998). pp. 3-l-45 . 
5 
.,. 
for the I <J30s, in view of the limited numbers of state economic enterprises 
and their o utput leve ls in comparison to the overall size of the Turkish 
economy at that time. 
I wil l s how that. as was the case in man y developing countries, 
government economic policies were rather eclect ic during the 1930s. While 
exchange rate pol ic ies resulted in the appreciat ion of the currency, fiscal 
and monetary policies were not expan sionary until the very end of the 
decade. Instead, the government preferred balanced budgets and a stable 
money supply. We thus have an apparent puzzle in our hands. How can 
such a cautiou s approach to macroeconomic policy be consis tent with the 
strong performance of the urban sector and the national economy ? 
I will argue that se vere import repression was one of the most 
important reasons behind the performance of the urban sector during the 
1930s. The protectionist measures adopted by the government including an 
increasingly restrictive foreign exchange regime and bilateral trading 
arrangements sharply reduced the import volume, creating attract ive 
conditions for the mostly small and medium sized domestic manufacturers. 
There is another explanation for the overall performance of both the 
urban and the national economy which has often been ignored by 
economists and economic historians in their often heated debates over 
etatism and its implications. For that I will turn to agriculture. the largest 
sector of the economy employing more than three-fourths of the labor force 
during the 1930s and accounting for close to half of the GDP. I will show 
that despite the sharp deterioration of the intersectoral terms of trade, 
agricultural output registered significant increases during the 1930s. I wi ll 
argue this strong performance can be explained in terms of the availabi lity 
of marginal lands combined with the demographic and economic recovery 
of the countryside after a decade of wars lasting until 1922. All of thi s 
inevitably raises questions about the effectiveness and contribution of the 
state secto r to the strong economic performance of the 1930s. 
2- The Great Depression 
The stru gg le for independence organi zed after World War I under the 
leaders hip of Mustafa Kemal against foreign occupation of the co untry 
culminated in the foundatio n of a new nation state in 1923. T he former 
military officers, bureaucra ts and intellec tual s who assumed the 
positions of leadership in the new republic had strong political, social 
6 
~nd ideological ties to the Young Turk movement. They had been 
mfluenced by the ideas of Enlightenment and the rationalist, libertarian 
thought of the French Revolution. During the War of Independence they 
had sought and obtained the support of provincial notables, large 
landowners, Muslim merchants and religious and tribal leaders, Turkish 
and Kurdish. They viewed the building of a new nation state and 
moderni zation through Western ization as two closely related goals. 
. Their economic policies followed directly from this outlook. They 
stnved, from the onset, to create a national economy within the new 
borders. Construction of new railroads and the nationalization of the 
existing companies were a lso seen as important steps towards the 
political and economic unification of the new state . Industrial ization and 
th.e cr~ation of a Turkish bourgeoisie were viewed as the key ingredients 
of national economic development. The Kemalist leade rship was also 
keen ly aware that Ottoman financial and economic dependence on 
European powers had created seriou s political problems for the Ottoman 
state. 8 
. After a decade of war and dramatic decline in output le vels, 
agncultural sector which accounted for c lose to half of the national 
economy experienced a s harp recovery during the 1920s. This recovery 
was helped by the favorable price and demand trends in the world 
markets, and in turn, provided an important lift to the urban economy. 
Sectoral growth rates summarized in Table 1 indicate that agricultural 
ou tput almost doubled from 1923 until 1929. Nonetheless detailed 
comparisons of Ottoman and Turkish production statistics su~oest that 
by the end ·of the decade per capita production levels in A."'natolian 
agr iculture were still somewhat lower than those prevailing on the eve 
of World War 1,9 
The principal mechani sm for the transmission of the Great 
De~ression to the Turkish economy was the sharp decline in the pri ces o f 
agn cultural commodities. Prices of wheat and other cereals declined by 
more than 60 percent from 1928-29 to 1932-33 and remained at those 
levels until the end of the decade. Prices of the leading export crops, 
tobacco. rais ins, hazelnuts and cotton also showed declines averaging 
around 50 percent, although they recovered somewhat later in the decade. 
S ince these decreases were greater than the decline in the prices of non-
agricultural goods. the external te rms of trade of the country deteriorated 
~ Tezel. C11mlwriver Diineminin. pp. 389-97; Keyder. Srare and Class in T11rkey, pp. 91-101. 
bzci and Pamuk (') 998). 
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by mo re than 25 percent and the domestic terms of trade shifted against 
auriculture by 3 1 percent from 1928-29 to 1932-33. (Tables 3 and 4). In c~ntrast, the physical volume of exports continued to ri se after 1929, 
perhaps refl ecting the continued recovery in output levels. Nonethele~s, the 
result was a sharp decline in the real incomes of most market-onented 
agricultural producers . The adverse price movements thu s produced a s~arp 
sense o f agricultural collapse, especially in the more commerctah zed 
regions of the country. 10 Also in 1929, the economy went through a severe 
foreign exc hange cri sis, both real and speculative, ari sing in part from the 
sharply hi gher import volume ahead of the expected tariff increases and tn 
part due to the anticipation of the first annual payment on the Ottoman 
debt. 11 
In respo nse, the government moved quickly towards protectionism 
and greater control over foreign trade and foreign exchange. A new tariff 
struc ture was adopted in October 1929 as soon as the restrictions of the 
1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty on commercial policy ended. Average tariffs 
o n imports are estimated to have increased from 13 to 46 percent in 1929 
and to more than 60 percent by the second half of the 1930s. Equally 
importantly, tariffs on imports of foodstuffs and manufactured consumer 
goods were rai sed substantially but kept lower for agricult~ral and 
indu strial machinery and raw materials. For this reason , the effecttve rates 
o f protection on many of the final goods selected for protection were 
substantially higher. In addition, quantity restrictions were introduced on 
the imports of a long list of goods in November 1931. The lists were 
updated frequently and some of the tariffs were raised further during the 
1930s as import substitution spread to new sectors. 12 The immediate 
beneficiaries were the small and medium scale manufacturing enterprises in 
many parts of the country consisting of textile mills, flour mills, glass 
works. brick factories, tanneries and others which began to experience high 
rates of gro wth. A recent study estimated the average rate of growth of this 
manufacturing secto r at 6. 3 percent per annum durin g 1929- 1933. 13 
The crisis that began in 1929 had a number of other importan t 
repercussio ns as well. First , concern for trade deficits and balance. of 
payments pro blems moved the government increasingly towards clean ng 
10 Since most of 1he impact of the Great Depression was fe lt through price effects. national 
income accounts prepared in constant prices do not reflect the severity of the impact. 
11 T eke li and Ilk in ( 1977). pp. 75-90 and Tezel (1986), pp. 98-106. 
1 ~ Ylice l ( 1996). pp. 74-8-1 and I 05- 11 3. 
11 Zc nd isavck (1 997). pp . 54- 106: also Yucel ( 1996), pp. 113-130: Boratav (1981), 
pp . 170-7(;: Kazgan ( 1977). pp. 231 -73. 
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and barter agreements and bilateral trade. By the second half of the decade, 
more than 80 percent of the country's foreign trade was being conducted 
under clearing and reciprocal quota systems. These bilateral arrangements 
also facilitated the expansion of trade with Nazi Germany, which offered 
more favorable prices for Turkey 's exports as part of its well-known 
strategy towards southeastern Europe. Germany's share in Turkey's exports 
rose from 13 percent in 193 1-33 to an average of40 percent for 1937-39. 
Simi larly, its share of Turkey's imports increased from 23 percent in 1931-
33 to 48 percent in 1937-39. 1 ~ 
It is significant that the government did not use exchange rate policy 
to improve the balance of payments and soften the impact of the 
depression. On the contrary, the existing parity of the Turkish Lira vis-a-
vis was strictly maintai ned even as the leading international currencies 
were devalued. As a resu lt of the actions of other governments, the Lira 
was revalued by a total of 40 percent against both the sterling and the 
dollar between 1931 and 1934 and the new parities were maintained until 
the end of the decade. 15 
Even though the export volume continued to rise in absolute terms, 
these far-reaching changes in the structure of foreign trade combined with 
the adverse price movements and the increases in GDP later in the decade 
to lead to a sharp decline in the share of exports in GDP from 11.4 percent 
in 1929-29 to 6.9 percent in 1938-39. (see Table 3) It is thus clear that 
exports d id not act as a source of recovery for the national economy during 
the 1930s. The causes of that recovery have to be searched elsewhere. 
Government concern with the balance of payments also led to a 
cessation of payments on the external debt and a demand for a new 
settlement after the first annual payment in 1929. The subsequent 
negotiations, aided by the cris is of the world economy and demands for 
resettlement by o ther debtors, produced a favorable result, reducing the 
annual payments by more than half for the rest of the decade. For the rest 
of the decade, the Kemali st regime sought foreign funds and expertise for 
its indu strial projects. Due to the world economic crisi s, however, inflows 
of foreign capital remained quite low during the 1930s.16 
1
•Tezel (1986) . pp . 139-62: Tekel i and llk in ( 1982 ). pp. 22 1-49. 
15 
Teze l ( 1986). pp. 144-150. Bent Hansen's cal culat ions s how that the e ffective 
exchan ge rate ag ainst the leading trade partners al so appreciated s harply during thi s 
pc:ri od. Hansen ( 1991 ). p . 374-75. ~ 
1
" Tc zcl ( 1986 ). pp. 165-89. 
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3- Etatism 
The difficulties of the agricul tural and export-oriented sectors quickly led 
to popular discontent with the single-party regime, especially in the more 
commercialized regions of the country: in western Anatolia, along the 
eastern Black Sea coast and the cotton growing Adana region in the south. 
The wheat producers of central Anatolia who were connected to urban 
markets by rail were also hit by the sharply lower prices . As the 
unfavorable world market conditions continued. the government announced 
in 1932 the beginning of a new strategy called ewtism, or state- led import 
substituting industrialization. 
Etatism promoted the state as a leadi ng produce r and investor in the 
urban sector. A first f ive-year industrial plan was adopted in 1934 with the 
assistance of Soviet advisers. This document provided a detailed list of 
in vestment projects to be undertaken by the state enterprises rather than an 
e laborate text of planning in the technical sense of the term. A second five-
year plan was initiated in 1938 but its implementation was interrupted by 
the War. By the end of the decade, state economic enterprises had emerged 
as important, and even leading , producers in a number of key sectors such 
as iron and steel, textiles, sugar, glass works, cement, utilities and 
. . 17 
mu11ng. 
Etatism involved the extension of state-sector activities and contro l 
to other parts of the urban economy as well. Railways which were 
nat ionalised from European ownership as well as the new ly constructed 
lines were transformed into state monopolies. Most of the state monopolies 
which had been handed over to private firms in the 1920s were taken back. 
In transportation, banking, and finance, state ownership of key enterprises 
was accompanied by increasing control over markets and prices. At the 
same time , the single-party regime maintained tight restrictions on labour 
organization and labour uni on activity. These measures paralleled the 
generally restrictive social policies of the government in other areas. It is 
significant that despite consid erable growth in the urban sector during the 
1930s, real wages did not exceed their levels of 1914. 18 
Etatism has undoubtedly had a long lasting impact in Turkey. For 
better or worse, th is experiment also proved to be inspirational for other 
17 Tckcli and llkin ( 1982). pp. 134-220: Tezel ( 1986), pp. 197-285 : Boratav 
( I<JS I ).pp. 172-89: Hansen ( 1991), pp. 324-335 : Hershlag ( 1968). chap1ers 4 and 9. 
1 ~ Pamuk ( 1995 ). pp. 96-102. 
10 
state-led industrialization attempts in the Middle East after World War II. 19 
From a macroeconomic perspective, however, the contribution of the state 
sector to the industrialization process in Turkey remained modest until 
World War 11. For one thing, state enterprises in manufacturing and many 
other areas did not begin operations until after 1933. The total n umber of 
active state enterprises in industry and mining on the eve of World War II 
did not exceed 20. Official fig ures indicate that in 1938 total employment 
in manufacturing, utilities and mining remained below 600 thousand or 
about 10 percent of the labor force. State enterprises accounted for only 11 
percent of this amount, or about I percent of to tal employment in the 
country. Approximately 75 percent of employment in manufacturing 
continued to be provided by small -scale private enterprises.~0 
It would be d ifficult to argue, however, t hat the private sector was 
hurt by the expansion of the state sector du ring the 1930s . The largest 
private enterprises were in the fo reign trade sector, and these were affected 
adversely by the contract ion of foreign trade. This was, however, more due 
to the dis integrati on of international trade than etati sm itself. Elsewhere in 
the urban economy, most of the private enterprises remained small in size. 
By invest ing in large, ex pensive projec ts in intermediate goods and 
providing them as inputs , the state ente rprises actually helped the growth 
of private enterprises in the manufacturing of final goods for the consumer. 
Private investments continued to be supported and subsidized during the 
1930s . Nonetheless , the private sector remained concerned that the state 
sector might expand at its own expense. Tensions between the two sides 
continued. 
There is some admit tedly crude eviden ce on the ra tes of investment 
by the s tate and private sectors which shed s additi onal light on their 
respective ro les. These estimates show that total gross investment in 
Turkey averaged more than 12 percen t of GDP during 1927-29. Private 
investment accounted for about 9 percent , and the rest came from the state 
sector, primarily in the form of railroad construction. With the onset of the 
Depression, pri va te investment dropped sharply to 5 percent of GDP and 
stayed at that level for the rest of the decade. State in vestments, on the 
other hand. rose modestly to an average of 5 percent of GDP by the end o f 
the decade . 2 1 These estimates suggest that the state sector mad e up for 
19 
For the influence of e tJtism on the state-led industria lizat ion strJteoies in other 
Midd le Easte rn coun tries after World War 11. see Richards and W aterbur; ( !990). pp. 
174-201. 
10 T eze l ( 1986). pp . 233-37. 
11 Tcze l ( 1986). pp . 362- 88. 
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some of the decline in private investment during the Depression but was 
not able to raise the overall rate of capital formation. It is also poss ible that 
the investment rates of the late 1920s were unusuall y high due to the post-
war reconstruction and recovery. If so, one may conclude that the 
aggregate rate of investment fully recovered in the second half of the 1930s 
e ven though it had declined after 1929. 
Sectoral breakdown of public sector investment is a lso instructive. 
C lose to half of all fixed in vestments by the public sector during the 1930s 
went to railway construct ion and other forms of transportation. This 
substantial commitment reflects the overriding desire of the single-party 
regime to create a politically and economically cohesive entity wit hin the 
new boundaries. In comparison, indu stry rece ived limited resources, 
attracting no more than a quarter of all public investment , or slightly above 
l percent of GDP during the second half of the 1930s. Thi s low figure 
supports our earlier argument that the contributi on of etatism to the 
industrialization process remained modest in the 1930s. 
4- Sources of Economic Growth 
It is difficu lt to be precise about the rate of growth of industrial output and 
more generally the rate of growth of the urban sector during the 1930s. In 
their reconstruction of the only series of national income accounts for the 
period before 1948, Tuncer Bulutay and his colleagues assumed, in the 
absence of other evidence, that the manufacturing sector as a whole grew at 
the same rate as those mostly large establishments which received 
subsidies from the government under the law for the Encouragement of 
Industry, for which data was available. 22 This method sharply overstated 
the extent of increase in manu facturi ng output. In fact, other independent 
evidence has since become available showin g that the small manufacturing 
establishments achieved a more modest increase in output during the 
1930s. The con sequent revis ions to the Bulutay calculations brin g down 
the o verall annual rate of growth for manufacturing indu stry from more 
than 10 percent to 5.2 percent per annum.23 This is undoubtedly a 
sign ifi cant correction, but the latter rate is still remarkable for the decade 
of the Great Depression. The revised estimates presented in Table 2 still 
point to a strong performance fo r the economy as a who le. 
~ ~ Bulutay et. al. ( 1974 ). 
~~ Zcndi sayek ( 1997), chapte r 4 . 
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We thu s have an apparent puzzle in o ur hands. We have evidence of 
strong performance by the industrial sector, the urban economy and the 
national economy. At the same time, aggregate figures show that the 
contribution of the state secto r to the urban economy, both as an investor 
and as a producer, was rather modest during the 1930s. How can these 
growth rates be explained? 
The experience of other developing countries during the 1930s 
suggest that one important candidate is exchange rate policy.2~ However, it 
has a lready been shown that rather than using devaluations to soften the 
impact of the depression, the government actually a llowed the Lira to 
appreciate by 40 percent against the sterling and the dollar between 1932 
and 1934. Simi larly, fisca l policy can hardly be characterised as 
ex pan sionary during the 1930s. Government revenues and expenditures 
increased only modestly from about 13 to I 5 percent of GDP in the late 
1920s to a new range of 17 to 19 percent during the 1930s. Government 
budgets remained balanced despi te minor yearly fluctuations and no 
attempt was made to use deficit financing as an additional mechanism for 
. . .,5 . generattng savmgs.- As a resu lt , the nommal amount of currency 
(banknotes plu s coinage) in circulation also remained stable and was linked 
closely to the gold and fore ign currency reserves of the Central Bank until 
1938. Despite this passive stance, there occurred a large increase in the real 
money suppl y after 1929 due to the decline of the aggregate price level.26 
The most important reason behind this cautious approach to 
macroeconomic policy was the bitter legacy of the Ottoman experience 
with budget deficits and large external debt until World War I and the 
intlationary experiment wi th paper currency during the War. Ismet Inbnti, a 
c lose associate of Atattirk and the prime minister for most of the interwar 
period, was a keen observer of the late Ottoman period and the person most 
responsible for this conservative policy stance.~7 
In the absence of the use of currency depreciation, fi scal policy or 
monetary policy to expand aggregate demand, the strong protectionist 
measures adopted by the government beginning in 1929 emerge as one of 
~· For the c lose relationship between exchange rate de valu ations and economic 
~ecovery in Lati n Ameri can countries during the 1930 s, see Campa ( 1990). 
"
5 Teze l ( 1986). pp. 368-88 ; Yticel (1996) , pp. 62-73. 
;o Yticel t 19%). pp. 55-59. it appears unlikely that th is de facto inc rease in the real 
~oney su pply had a significan t impact o n the leve l of aggregate demand. 
-
7 The gove rnmen t ' s re luctance to pursue expansio nary polic ies was. of course, 
cons istent with the orthodoxy of the period. For a recent survey of the restrictive 
fi sca l and monetary policy that prevailed in the Uni ted States and western Europe 
until 1933. see Tcmin ( 1989), chapte r :!; also Eic hengreen (1992). 
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the key causes of the output increases after 1929.28 In addition to tariffs 
and quotas on a wide variety of manufactured goods, an increasingly 
rest rictive foreign exchange regime and a growing reliance on bilateral 
trading arrangements sharply reduced imports from 15.4 percent of GDP in 
1928-29 to 8.7 percent by 1932-33 and 6.8 percent by 1938-39. Even more 
importantly, the composition o f imports changed dramatically. The share .of 
final goods declined from 51 percent in 1929 to 21 percent in 1940 while 
the share of intermediate goods rose from 26 percent to 54 percent and 
machinery and equipment from 9 percent to 22 percent during the same 
period. Severe import repression thus created very attractive conditions for 
the domestic manufacturers after 1929. These mostly small and medtum 
sized producers achieved relatively high rates of output growth for the 
entire decade until World War 11. 19 
There is yet another explanation for the overall performance of both 
the urban and the national economy which has often been ignored by 
economists and economic historians in their often heated debates over 
etatism and its meaning.3° For that we need to turn to agriculture, the 
largest sector of the economy, employing more than three fourths of the 
labor force during the 1930s and accounting for close to half of the GDP. 
5- Agricultural Expansion During the Depression 
The story of the agricultural sector during the interwar period has two 
parts, one about prices, the other about quantities. First, as it h.as al.ready 
been pointed out. the collapse of commodity prices and the detenorallon of 
the intersectoral terms of trade after 1929 had severe consequences for 
most producers. Not only did the market-oriented producers , both small 
and large, in the more commercialized, export-oriented regions of the 
country experience a decline in their standards of living, but so too dtd the 
more self-sufficient producers of cereals in the interior. The decline in the 
terms of trade of the latter were in fact much greater than those of the 
producers of non-cereals. (See Table 4) The sharp decline in .agricultural 
prices also increased the burden of the indebted peasantry, forcmg many to 
g ive up their independent plots and accept sharecropping arrangements. 
!M See Table 2 and Tczel (1986) , pp. 102- 103 . 
:•l Zc ndi savck ( 1997), pp . 54-105: Yiicel (1996). pp . 89- 130. 
1° For the. debate. see Hershlag (1968). chapter 4; Boratav (1981): Keyder (1987), 
.: haptcr 5 and Tczel ( 1986). pp. 197-232. 
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One of the responses of the government was to initiate, after 1932, 
direct and indirect price support programs in wheat and tobacco. It began 
to purchase wheat from the producers, first through the Agricultural Bank, 
and later via an independent agency established for this purpose called the 
Soil Products Office. Until the end of the decade, however, such purchases 
remained limited , averaging 3 percent of the overall crop or about 15 
percent of the marketed wheat. 31 
These purchases may have prevented a further decline in wheat 
prices, but they certainly did not reverse the sharp deterioration of the 
terms of trade faced by the wheat producers. In fact, a comparison of the 
Turkish wheat prices with those of the U.S. shows that the domestic price 
of wheat had been above international world prices before 1929 when 
Turkey was a net importer. With the increases in wheat production, 
domestic prices fell below and remained close to the sharply lower 
international prices during the 1930s. Clearly, the sharply lower 
agricultural prices were seen as an opportunity by the government to 
accelerate the industrialization process in the urban areas. It is also 
significant that the prices of export crops, and more generally of the non-
cereal crops did not fare as poorly. The terms of trade faced by the 
producers of non-cereals improved after 1934, regaining their pre-1929 
3' levels by the end of the decade. (Table 4) -
More generally, the distributional impact of protectionism during the 
1930s can be analyzed with a sector-specific factors model. Turkey was a 
land-abundant, capital and labor-scarce country during the interwar period. 
Agriculture used land and labor and the urban sector used capital and 
labor. Despite the possibility of rural -u rban migration, labor and capital 
was mostly immobile between the rural and urban sectors until 1950. 
Under these circumstances. the rural-urban dichotomy can best explain the 
distributional impact of the tariffs. Land and labor in agriculture lost but 
capital and labor in the urban sector gained from protectionism.33 
31 based o n Atasagun ( 1939) and Bulutay et. al. (1974 ). 
31 In contrast to the studies approaching the 1930s from the perspective of urban 
economy and etatism. Faruk Birtek and <;:aglar Keyder emphasized the importance of 
agriculture and the key position of the middle farmer. They argued that a key element 
in government policy of the period was the political alliance with and the s upport 
provided to the medium-sized , market-oriented wheat producer. Birtek and Keyder 
( 1975) . While the emphasis on the countryside is refreshing, the argument is not 
consis tent with the limited volume of wheat purchases and the trends in relative 
prices . For a s imilar criticism. see Boratav ( 1981 ). pp. 180-86. 
.•J Sec O'Rourke (1995) and O'Rourke ( 1997). pp. 77 5-81 and compare with the more 
general Hecks her-Ohlin framework used by Rogowski ( 1989) . 
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However. such an analysis needs to take into account second order 
effet:ts as wel l. Most importantly, there were the benefits to the agricultural 
sector of the growth and industrialization in the urban sector. In addition to 
increased demand for traditional foodstuffs, the rise of manufactures in 
textiles, sugar, tobacco and other products created new demand for cotton, 
sugar beets, tobacco and other cash crops. Domestic prices of these crops 
may have exceeded international prices during the second half of the 
1930s. If so, these second order effects helped di stribute some of the 
benefit s of urban growth to the rural sector. 
The second part of the story about agriculture during the Great 
Depress ion is less well known, but at least equally important. Evidence 
fro m a variety of sources, including the official statist ics, show that 
agricultural output increased by 50 percent to 70 percent during the 1930s, 
after adjustments are made for fluctuations due to weather. The evidence 
thus indicates an average rate of growth of more than 4 percent per year for 
aggregate agricultural output during the decade. Similarly, foreign trade 
statist ics indicate that Turkey turned from being a small net importer of 
cereals at the end of the 1920s into a small net exporter of wheat and other 
cereals on the eve of World War 11, despite a population increase of 20 
percent during the 1930s. (Tables I and 4) 34 
The next task wou ld be to explain these substantial increases in 
output in the face of un favorable price movements. Two di fferent and not 
mutually exclusive explanations appear possible, although it may not be 
easy to assess the contributions of each without more detailed research. 
First, government policies may have played a role. Most importantly, the 
abolition of the tithe in 1924 may have contributed to the recovery of the 
family farm by improving the welfare of small and medium-sized producers 
and helping them to expand the area under cultivation or to raise yields. 
Another important contribution of government policy was the construction 
of railways. which helped integrate additional areas of Central and Eastern 
Anatolia into the national market. Railways may have encouraged the 
production of more cereals in these areas. The government was also 
involved in a number of other programs in support of the agricu ltural 
sector. such as the expansion o f credit to farmers through the state-owned 
Agricultura l Bank. promotion of new agricultural techniques and higher 
yielding varie ties crops. Despi te the rhetoric from official circ les, these 
'" Net imports of wheat averaged percent of :!.0 domestic production during 1926-
1929. Net e"pons of wheat averaged 2 .5 percent of domestic production a decade 
1~tcr. Juring 1936- 1939. Tur key. Statistical Yearbooks fo r 1930-3 1 and 1940-41 and 
Bu1utay ( 1974 l. 
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programs did not receive large resources, however, and their impact 
remained limited. 
The second explanation focuses on the long-term demographic 
recovery of the family farms and their response to lower prices. In the 
in terwar period. Anatolian agriculture contin ued to characterized by 
peasan t households wh ich cult ivated their own land with a pai r of draft 
animals and the most basic of implements . Most of the la rge holdings were 
rented out to sharecropping fam ilies . Large-scale enterprises us ing 
imported machinery, implements and wage labourers remained ra re. 
Irrigat ion and the use of commerci al inpu ts such as fertilisers also 
remained very limited. If one reason for the st rength of family farms was 
the scarc ity o f labour, the other was the availability of land, especially after 
the death and departure of million s of peasants, both Muslim and non-
Muslim during the decade of wars. Under these c ircumstances, increases in 
production were achieved primari ly throug h the expansion of cultivated 
area, so that a shortage of labor emerged as the effective constraint m 
blocking higher agricultural output in most parts of the country. 
After the wars ended and the population began to increase at annual 
rates of around 2 percent, the agricultural labor force followed suit, a lbeit 
with a time Jag, thus fac ilitating the ex pan sion of the area under 
cultivation. The bas ic agricu ltural trends summarized in Table 4 confirm 
th is picture. They show that wh ile y ields remained little changed, the area 
under cult ivat ion expanded substant ially during the 1930s. Area cultivated 
per pe rson and per household in agriculture also increased . Numbers of 
draft animals rose by about 40 percent during the same period, both 
confirming the material recovery of the peasant household and faci litating 
the expansion in cult ivated area. 35 Compari sons of the late Ottoman and 
early Turkish stat istics indicate that per capita agricultural output did not 
return to pre-World War I levels until 1929 and the early 1930s . Total 
agricultural output reached pre-War levels only in the second half of the 
decade. The availability of land also helps explain why land reform and re-
distribution of land did not become an important issue in Turkey during the 
interwar period except in the southwest where Kurdish tribal leaders 
controlled large tracts of land. 36 
An additional factor contribut ing to o utput growth may have been 
due to the economic behavior of peasant house holds. It is possible that 
peasant households re lying mostly on family labor responded to the lower 
'
5 Shorter ( 1985). 
'" K.:yd.:r ;md Pamuk ( 1984). pp. 61-63. 
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cereal prices after 1929 by working harder to cultivate more land and 
produce more cereals in order to reach certain target levels of income. 
Increases in land under cultivation per household and per person in the 
agricultural labor force would support this explanation as well as the 
argument for the demographic and economic recovery of the family farm.
37 
Sharply lower prices and n smg output levels in agriculture thus 
created very favorable conditions for the urban sector during the Interwar 
period. Underlying the high rates of industrialization and gro':th in ~he 
urban areas were the millions of family farms in the cou ntryside which 
continued to produce more despite the lower prices. These increases in 
crop output, in turn, kept food prices low ~or longer period~ of time . 
Without this performance from the countrys1de, protection ot domestic 
industry alone would not have allowed the urban sector to achieve such 
high rates of growth. (Graph 3) 
7- Conclusion 
The case of Turkey during the Great Depression is unique around the 
eastern Mediterranean not only because of the extent of government 
interventionism but also the strength of economic recovery. At the same 
time, however, this paper has shown that the policy mix in Turkey was 
rather unusual in comparison to the activist government initiatives in other 
developing countries in Latin America and Asia. In Turkey, government 
interventionism was not designed, in the Keynesian sense, to increase 
aggregate demand through the use of devaluations and expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies. Instead, the emphasis was on creating a more 
closed, more autarkic economy and increasing central control through the 
expans ion of the public sector. These preferences were directly related to 
the bureaucratic nature of the regime. 
The paper has also shown that contrary to the assertions of much of 
the exist ing literature, the contribution of the state sector to the recovery 
and orowth of the 1930s remained limited. Instead, it was the small and 
e . 
medium sized private enterprises benefiting from the severe 1mport 
repress ion and the strong performance of the agricultural sector that 
sustained the economy until late in the decade. 
JJ Th1s would he consistent wilh the behavior of the peasant household as analyzed by the 
Russian ~'onomist Chayanov ( 1987). 
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The economic model and strategy for development thus created 
during the Great Depression worked in the 1930s, and for the most part, 
through the 1960s when much of the import substitution was technically 
simple and protectionism created strong incentives for continued 
accumulation in the urban sector. The state sector played an important role 
in the industrialization process during this period. Since then, however, the 
legacy of the 1930s has been casting a long shadow on Turkey's economic 
development. Efforts to reduce the extent of government regulations and 
privatize the state economic enterprises has had a mixed record against the 
political and legal opposition during the last two decades. 
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Table 1 
Turkey : Basic Economic Indicators 1923-1946 
1923 1929 1939 1946 
Population in millions 13 14 17.5 19 
Share of Agriculture in th e n.a. 80 77 77 
labor force 
GNP per capita in 1990 PPP 615 1,015 I ,425 1,180 
doll. 
Share of agriculture in GNP 40 52 39 46 
(percent) 
Share of Man u factu r ing in 12 9 17 13 
GN P (percent) 
Share of Total Industry incl. 16 14 22 18 
const ruction in GNP 
..,. 
Table 2 
Turkey: A Periodization of Economic G rowth, 1923-1946 
Average Annual Rates 
1923 1923 1929 1939 
to to to to 
of Growth in percent 1946 1929 1939 1946 
Popu lation 1.9 l.7 2.2 1.2 
GNP 4 .6 10.3 5 .2 -2.0 
GNP pe r c apita 2.6 8.4 3 .0 -3. 2 
Ag ricultura l Ou tput 4.9 13 .6 4.4 - 1.4 
Manufacturing Output 3 .3 7.2 5.2 -3.0 
Total Industrial Output 4 .5 10.2 5. 7 - 2.6 
including construct ion 
Sources fo r Tables I a11d 2: 
Calculations based on Tur key. S tat e Insti tute of Statistics (1994); Bu lutay e t. al. 
(197-t) and fo r the conversion to 1990 PPP dollars, Maddison ( 1995), pp . 184-85. 
The Bulutay e t. a l. estimates for the growth rate s of manufacturing outpu t and other 
related aggregates for 1929-39 we re re vised downwards following the calculati ons 
by Zcndisayck ( 1997). chapte r 4. 
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Table 3 
Turkey's Foreign T rade, 1924-1946 
1924-5 1928-9 1938-9 1945-6 
Exports (mi ll. do ll ars) 92 .5 8 1.5 107 .5 192.0 
Imports (m ill. doll ars) 114 .5 97.0 105 .5 108.5 
Exports/GNP ( in percen t) 12 .8 11.4 6 .9 5.2 
lmports/GNP (i n pe rcen t ) 15 .8 14.4 6.8 2.8 
Trade Balance/GN P(percent) -3.0 - 3.0 + 0 . 1 +2.4 
E xterna l terms of trade 129 100 79 68 
(expo rt p ri ces/i mport prices) 
Sources: 
Turkey. State Institute of Stati sti cs ( 1994) and calcul atio ns based on Bulutay e t. al. 
( 1974) . 
Table 4 
Turkey : Agricultural Production and Prices, 1928-1946 
(all ind ices un less indicated otherwise) 
1929-30 1938-39 19-t5--t6 
Labor Force 100 119 125 
Cu ltivated Land 100 142 135 
Total Crop Ou tpu t 100 146 120 
Tow l Yields 100 103 89 
Wheat Out put in million Tons 2.4 3.8 2.6 
Wheat Output l OO 160 110 
Wheat Yie lds l OO 11 3 81 
Cerea ls Output l OO 148 99 
Non -cerea l Outp ut 100 148 146 
Relative prices : 1928-9 1932-3 1938-9 1945-6 
Internal terms of trade 100 69 81 95 
agl prices/non -agl prices 
cereal prices/ 100 55 57 80 
non-ag l p rices 
pnc.:cs o f non-cereal c ro ps/ 100 90 104 109 
nun-agl prices 
Note: 1928 1s excluded from the p ro duction indi ce s since it was an exceptiona lly 
poor harvest year. 
Sortrces: 
C<l k u la tio ns based o n Bul utay et. a l.( 197-t ). 
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